An implementation of a High Assurance Smart Meter using Protected Module Architectures by Mühlberg, Tobias et al.
An Implementation of a High Assurance Smart
Meter using Protected Module Architectures
Jan Tobias Mu¨hlberg1, Sara Cleemput2, Mustafa A. Mustafa2, Jo Van Bulck1,
Bart Preneel2 and Frank Piessens1
1 iMinds-DistriNet, KU Leuven, Celestijnenlaan 200A, B-3001 Belgium
2 KU Leuven, ESAT-COSIC and iMinds, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, B-3001
Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium
Abstract. Due to ongoing changes in the power grid towards decen-
tralised and highly volatile energy production, smart electricity meters are
required to provide fine-grained measurement and timely remote access
to consumption and production data. This enables flexible tariffing and
dynamic load optimisation. As the power grid forms part of the critical
infrastructure of our society, increasing the resilience of the grid’s software
components against failures and attacks is vitally important.
In this paper we explore the use of Protected Module Architectures
(PMAs) to securely implement and deploy software for smart electricity
meters. Outlining security challenges and an architectural solution in
the light of security features provided by PMAs, we evaluate a proof-of-
concept implementation of a security-focused smart metering scenario.
Our implementation is based on Sancus, an embedded PMA for low-
power microcontrollers. The evaluation of our prototype provides strong
indication for the feasibility of implementing a PMA-based high assurance
smart meter with a very small software Trusted Computing Base, which
would be suitable for security certification and formal verification.
Keywords: smart meter security, smart grid, protected module architectures,
distributed embedded computing, Sancus
1 Introduction
The smart grid is an extension of the traditional electricity grid. It includes smart
appliances, renewable energy resources and smart electricity meters, facilitating
bidirectional communication between these components and stakeholders, e.g.,
between a smart meter and the grid operator [9]. This is needed to deal with
the volatility of renewable energy sources and new appliances such as electric
vehicles, and to increase the reliability and sustainability of electricity delivery –
one of the most critical resources of our time.
Electricity Smart Metering Equipment (ESME), i.e., smart meters, have three
main responsibilities. Firstly, ESME measure the consumption of electricity and
essential grid parameters, such as voltage or frequency, and timely provide this
data to the grid operator. Secondly, they operate a Load Switch, which can
disconnect a premise from the electricity grid. The grid operator may use this in
emergency cases to avoid a black-out. Finally, ESME communicate consumption
data to smart appliances or an In-Home Display (IHD) present at the premise
for local inspection and micro-management by the client. Relying on ESME
involves security risks that range from privacy infringements to full-scale black-
outs [12,29]. Physically isolating an ESME’s critical software components, e.g.,
by using multiple microprocessors, can mitigate attacks against the grid’s digital
infrastructure. However, this can be prohibitively expensive and the use of
trusted computing to achieve logical separation has been proposed [29,16]. An
architecture based on trusted computing to implement High Assurance Smart
Meters (HASMs) – smart meters with high security guarantees, certification and
verification as design goals – poses a potential solution [4].
In this paper we implement a simplified scenario for smart meter deploy-
ment and evaluate its security aspects. We refer to components from the British
Department of Energy & Climate Change’s “Smart Metering Implementation
Programme (SMIP)” [6]. However, our implementation may divert substantially
with respect to details specified in the SMIP documents. We simplify communi-
cation protocols and we adopt architectural changes suggested in [4], relying on
Protected Module Architectures (PMAs) [23] to implement security features. Our
choice of technologies suggests a number of architectural changes relative to [6,4],
which we discuss in detail. Importantly, the goal of this paper is not to accurately
implement the SMIP specification but to provide a security-focused reference
implementation that illustrates the use of embedded PMAs to achieve a notion of
high assurance smart metering by means of logical component isolation, mutual
authentication and by minimising the software Trusted Computing Base (TCB).
Our scenario contains software components that implement a HASM to be
installed at a client’s premises, and a Load Switch that can enable or disable
power supply to the premises. We further implement components to represent
the grid operator’s Central System and an IHD. The HASM and the Load Switch
communicate with the Central System via a Wide Area Network (WAN) Inter-
face. In our case, the WAN Interface supports periodic access to the HASM’s
operational data, as well as control of the Load Switch. The HASM and the IHD
communicate via the Home Area Network (HAN) Interface. Only consumption
data is periodically sent from the HASM to the IHD via this interface. All compo-
nents are implemented in software only and are meant to be deployed as Protected
Modules (PMs) on microcontrollers or larger systems that facilitate software
component isolation and authenticated and secure communication between PMs.
Essentially, we model a smart metering scenario as a distributed reactive system,
relying on security features provided by modern PMAs.
In the remainder of this paper we describe the basic architecture of a smart me-
tering environment according to the SMIP documents [6]. We outline security chal-
lenges and an architectural solution as described in [4], in the light of security fea-
tures provided by PMAs. The key contribution of this paper is to provide a proof-
of-concept implementation of a security-focused smart metering scenario, based
on Sancus [19], an embedded PMA for low-power TI-MSP430 microcontrollers.
We discuss the security objectives and architectural considerations of our imple-
mentation and evaluate its performance and the impact on the size of the system’s
deployed and trusted code base. Our prototype and evaluation provide a strong
indication for the feasibility of implementing a secure, high assurance ESME and
communicating controllers for smart home appliances, based on our architecture.
The Sancus core, infrastructure software and our implementation are available at
https://distrinet.cs.kuleuven.be/software/sancus/wistp16/.
2 High Assurance Smart Metering
Smart Electricity Metering. The British SMIP working documents [6,5]
specify the physical requirements, functional requirements, interface and data
requirements of an ESME. According to [6], an ESME minimally includes the
following physical components: a clock, data storage, an electricity meter (i.e.,
metrology component), a Load Switch, a random number generator, a display, a
HAN Interface, and a physical interface to connect to an independent Communi-
cation Hub [5], which is responsible for communicating with the grid operator’s
Central System over a dedicated WAN Interface. The ESME can communicate
with the Communication Hub via its HAN Interface, which is furthermore used
to connect to two types of local devices. Type 1 devices store security credentials
and can exchange authenticated and encrypted commands and data with the
ESME, whereas Type 2 devices do not store any security credentials and can
only receive commands or data from the ESME.
As for the ESME’s functional requirements, three main categories can be
distinguished. First, an ESME should be capable of establishing and maintaining
confidentiality- and integrity-preserving communication channels to receive com-
mand from and send data to the Central System (via the Communication Hub)
and pre-defined local devices. Second, the ESME should be able to calculate bills,
based on up-to-date tariffs, in credit as well as in prepayment mode. Finally, the
ESME should be able to disconnect the household from the electricity grid by
operating a Load Switch.
In addition, the ESME should store the following types of data: constant data
(e.g., identifiers, model type, variant), internal data (e.g., installation credentials),
configuration data (e.g., billing calendar, device log, security credentials, electricity
quality thresholds), and operational data (e.g., import/export energy registers,
cumulative and historical consumption data, power event log, security log).
Smart Metering Using Trusted Computing. However, ESME might be
insufficiently secure, since (1) there is little isolation between the different modules
that run on it, (2) it is possible to influence the ESME via the HAN Interface,
and (3) it is easy to fill up the security log with non-critical events. Also, it might
be impractical to have the Communication Hub physically separated from the
ESME. In fact, the ESME should be a high assurance system, since the safety
and security requirements are critical, due to the potentially huge physical impact
of an attack. The German BSI has decided to introduce a specific component,
the smart meter gateway, to their smart metering architecture [2]. This gateway,
which is installed at a client’s premise, acts as communication unit between the
client’s local devices (including the ESME) and the Central System, and provides
the necessary security properties by deploying several layers of protection using a
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Although this solution provides a sufficient level
of security, as also pointed out by von Oheimb [28], it is prohibitively expensive
in terms of computational costs (mainly due to the use of PKI). Yan et al. [29],
as well as Metke and Ekl [16] proposed using trusted computing in the smart
grid to provide system, process and data integrity. However, they gave no details
on how to implement this. Petrlic [21] proposed that each ESME must have a
trusted platform module which acts as a tamper-resistant device and calculates
users’ bills based on the metering data measured at the ESME and the pricing
data provided by the Central System. Jawurek et al. [11] proposed to use a
plug-in component – placed between the ESME and the Central System – to
calculate users’ bills. LeMay et al. [14] described an implementation of a smart
meter using Trusted Platform Modules and Virtual Machine Monitors. Unlike
our work however, they did not give details on the internal architecture of the
smart meter.
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Fig. 1. Simplified version of a HASM according to [4].
The HASM proposed by Cleemput et al. (shown in Figure 1) [4] contains
roughly the same physically separate components as the ESME: data storage, the
Load Switch, the main processor, the metrology component, the display, and the
clock. However, it also features a second processor for the Load Switch security
module. The HASM has six different communication interfaces: an interface to
the other-utility meter, an interface to the local generation, the HAN Interface,
an interface to the top-up gateway, a local maintenance interface and an interface
to a data concentrator.
There are several differences between this HASM and the standard ESME:
– A HASM contains an additional processor which houses a dedicated security
module with exclusive access to the Load Switch. This is the most critical
module in the smart meter, since hacking this module allows an attacker to
disconnect households from the electricity grid.
– A separation kernel is used to logically isolate the rest of the modules on
the main processor. These modules are: security modules, a computations
module and a communications module. The latter corresponding to the
Communication Hub in the ESME architecture. However, rather than being
a separate component, we consider it as a part of the HASM.
– The log files are divided into three different logs: a metrology log, a security
log and a Load Switch log. This ensures that the attacker cannot flush an
event out of the Load Switch log by generating less critical security events.
– The three security modules implement separate communication components,
one for the Data Concentrator, one for the Top-Up component, and one for
the Central System.
– All incoming communication must first go through the communications
module and from there on directly to one of the security modules.
– The HAN Interface must be a one-way interface, such that only communi-
cation from the HASM to the HAN gateway is possible. This is important,
since the smart appliances and the IHD are considered untrusted components,
so they should not be able to influence the HASM. Note that this means,
we only consider Type 2 devices. We believe this is a practical assumption,
since the in-home devices are not under the control of the grid operator,
thus it is difficult to have pre-established keys between these devices and
the HASM. Furthermore, we cannot think of convincing use cases where
communication from the in-home devices to the HASM is strictly necessary.
The main difference between the HAN Interface and the WAN Interface is
that the latter is an interface to a trusted entity. Thus, the WAN Interface is
a bidirectional interface, where all data is authenticated and encrypted.
Our Scenario. In this paper we present a simplified version of a HASM, as
illustrated in Figure 1. We do not consider the display present on the smart meter
itself, and we only consider two communication interfaces: a WAN Interface to
the Central System and a HAN Interface to the HAN gateway. Moreover, we
implement only the following representative subset of ESME use cases.
Billing. For our implementation we only consider non-prepaid billing in Credit-
Mode. Prepaid billing is an interesting use case in itself that exhibits security
and privacy aspects different from non-prepaid billing. We are confident that
our prototype could easily be extended to support prepaid billing. There are
two main threats to the billing process: fraud and privacy infringements.
Load switching. As mentioned above, the Load Switch can be used to remotely
enable or disable power supply at the client’s premises. The main threat for
this use case consists of an adversary who manages to cause a large-scale
black-out by triggering the Load Switch. This is the most critical threat to
our architecture, since concurrently disconnecting many consumers may cause
a cascading instability, eventually bringing down large parts of the electricity
grid. Ultimately, even public facilities that rely on the electricity grid, such
as sewer operations, traffic lights and the telephone network, will be affected.
Consumer feedback. The goal of providing the user with fine-grained con-
sumption data through the HAN Interface is to realise energy savings, as
well as to allow them to connect smart appliances. The main threat in this
use case is an adversary influencing the smart meter via the HAN Interface.
3 Authentic Execution with PMAs
PMAs [23] are a new brand of hardware security architectures, the main objec-
tive of which is to support the secure and isolated execution of critical software
components with a minimal, hardware-only TCB. Implementations of PMAs for
higher-end systems – Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [15] or ARM’s
TrustZone [1] – as well as several prototypes for embedded application do-
mains [8,19,13] have been proposed. Software components that are specifically
designed and implemented to leverage PMA features are provided with strong
confidentiality and integrity guarantees regarding their internal state, and can
mutually authenticate each other. More specifically, modern PMAs offer a number
of security primitives to (1) configure memory protection domains, (2) enable or
disable software module protection, and (3) facilitate key management for secure
local or remote inter-module communication and attestation.
A Notion of Authentic Execution. PMAs allow us to securely implement
authentic execution of distributed event-driven applications that execute on a
heterogeneous shared infrastructure with a small TCB. These applications are
characterised by consisting of multiple components that execute on different
computing nodes and for which program flow is determined by events such as
sensor inputs or external requests. As an example, consider the HASM with its
sensors (electricity measuring element), communication interfaces (WAN and
HAN), and actuators (Load Switch).
Roughly speaking, our notion of authentic execution is the following: if the
application produces a physical output event (e.g., disabling supply via the Load
Switch), then there must have happened a sequence of physical input events
such that that sequence, when processed by the application (as specified by the
application’s source code), produces the output event.
This notion of authentic execution does provide strong integrity guarantees:
it rules out both spoofed events as well as tampering with the execution of
the program. Informally, if the executing program produces an output event,
it could also have produced that same event if no attacker was present. Any
physical output event can be explained by means of the untampered code of the
application, and the actual physical input events that have happened.
Building Blocks. Authentic execution relies on well-defined application com-
ponents that are encapsulated as PMs and that are protected by the PMA. PM
software components consist of a contiguous code and data section in the shared
address space. Hardware-level PMAs such as Sancus [19] rely on a lightweight
program counter based access control mechanism [25] to enforce that a PM’s
private data section is exclusively managed via its corresponding code section,
which can only be entered via a few predefined entry points. The latter impedes
code abuse attacks (e.g., Return Oriented Programming [3]) against PMs.
In distributed event-driven applications, each PM consumes input events and
produces output events. The types of these events and communication channels
are to be defined at compile-time. Components that directly interact with sensors
or actuators are further able to claim exclusive access to interrupt vectors or
device registers that are accessed through memory-mapped I/O on low-end
microcontrollers [19]. Program code and access permissions form the identity
of a PM, which can be attested cryptographically by remote parties, including
other components of the distributed application. Intuitively, successful attestation
implies that a software component is deployed with no modifications on a specific
computing node, obtained exclusive access over its desired hardware resources,
and that protection has been enabled through the PMA.
Trusted Computing Base. A key strength of hardware-level PMAs such as
Sancus is that they reduce the TCB up to the point where a remote stakeholder
only has to trust the Sancus-enabled microcontroller, and the implementation of
his own modules to be guaranteed authentic execution. Only the software com-
ponents that implement the actual application logic of a distributed application
have to be deployed as PMs. Of course, the compilation and deployment pro-
cesses, running on the remote stakeholder’s infrastructure, still need to be trusted.
Yet, supporting software such as (embedded) Operating Systems (OSs), network
stacks, module loaders, and even components implementing event management
and distribution are explicitly untrusted as to authentic execution security guaran-
tees. However, as we outline further on, such infrastructure software components
may be trusted with regard to availability guarantees.
4 Implementation
In this section we present and discuss our proof-of-concept implementation of a
HASM’s software stack. Relying on Sancus [19] as the underlying architecture
and the approach to authentic execution outlined in Section 3, we implement
a representative subset of the HASM architecture as a reactive system, which
is illustrated in Figure 2: The core of our implementation is formed by three
distributed PMs that realise the ESME’s metering component, the Load Switch,
and the grid operator’s Central System. These PMs communicate bidirectionally
over the untrusted WAN interface, where authenticated encryption is used to
guarantee confidentiality and authenticity of messages, and to attest module
Fig. 2. Our implementation of a HASM’s software stack using distributed PMs. Boxes
shaded in red represent PMs and continuous arrows denote secure communication
channels between these PMs. The IHD executes without PMA protection and must
rely on alternative mechanisms to secure its communication with the HAN Interface.
integrity. A fourth PM implements the HAN Gateway, which acts as a unidirec-
tional security gateway to relay consumption data to in-house appliances such
as the IHD. For completeness we add such an IHD as an untrusted software
component. The PMs are deployed and configured according to a Deployment
Descriptor that defines which modules are to be loaded on which computing
nodes and which module outputs are to be linked to which inputs. A section of
the Deployment Descriptor, focusing on the Load Switch PM is given in Listing 1.
Our implementation runs on two TI MSP430 microcontrollers that implement
the Sancus extensions; we rely on the Contiki OS [7] for untrusted supporting
software such as the scheduler and the network stack. Figure 2 mentions three
driver PMs that are meant to securely produce low-level I/O events (i.e., clock
ticks and electricity consumption readings) and to operate actuators (the Load
Switch). As we do not have all these hardware components available, we have left
the implementation of these driver PMs for future work. Key features of Sancus
and other PMAs are hardware-based isolation and integrity protection of PMs,
and the built-in mechanisms for deriving, storing and managing cryptographic
keys. These features naturally lead to a number of changes in the overall design of
a HASM, specifically with respect to the system’s communication infrastructure.
We discuss these design choices below.
Communications. In our implementation, the Communications component
described in Section 2 is represented by an Event Manager which is an untrusted
software component running on every node that is responsible for routing events
from a PM’s outputs to (another) PM’s inputs. The Event Manager cannot
decrypt and inspect these events. Instead, PMs themselves maintain keys for
1 {
2 "nodes": [
3 {
4 "type": "sancus",
5 "name": "node1",
6 "ip_address": "...",
7 "vendor_id": 4660,
8 "vendor_key": "..."
9 }
10 ],
11 "modules" : [
12 {
13 "type": "sancus",
14 "name": "HASM_LS",
15 "files": ["hasm_ls.c"],
16 "node": "node1"
17 }
18 ],
19 "connections": [
20 {
21 "from_module": "CS",
22 "from_output": "ls_out",
23 "to_module": "HASM_LS",
24 "to_input": "cs_in"
25 },
26 {
27 "from_module": "HASM_LS",
28 "from_output": "cs_out",
29 "to_module": "CS",
30 "to_input": "ls_in"
31 },
32 {
33 "from_module": "ESME",
34 "from_output": "ls_out",
35 "to_module": "HASM_LS",
36 "to_input": "esme_in"
37 },
38 {
39 "from_module": "HASM_LS",
40 "from_output": "esme_out",
41 "to_module": "ESME",
42 "to_input": "ls_in"
43 }
44 ]
45 }
46
Listing 1: Deployment descriptor for the Load Switch PM: HASM LS
each communication channel. Decrypting events and verifying authenticity and
freshness is implemented by each module, based on the cryptographic primitives
provided by the PMA hardware. In consequence, PMs such as our Load Switch
component and the Central System are easier and more securely implemented by
defining bidirectional communication channels that use communication media
and the Event Manager transparently, relying on purpose-specific keys.
In Listing 1 we present the section of the Deployment Descriptor that is
relevant for deploying and configuring the Load Switch PM. As can be seen,
the Deployment Descriptor specifies which node the PM is to be deployed on,
and how input and output channels are to be linked together. Intuitively, a
connections entry defines a unidirectional channel between a from module PM
and a to module PM. The entries from output and to input correspond with
module-specific handles for the connection that can be referred to in the source
code of each PM. At deployment time, when configuring the channel, a symmetric
key is securely transferred to each of the two PM endpoints, using hardware-level
module keys provided by the PMA implementation.
We illustrate the use of module-specific channel handles in Listing 2. The
Sancus compiler ensures that only successfully authenticated and decrypted
events will ever be received at the input handles, and the PM’s source code
defines how to react upon these events. E.g., the Load Switch PM implements
an access control policy by defining that only the Central System may issue
commands to change the system’s supply state. The ESME PM may only query
the supply state. In a more realistic implementation, changing the supply state
must then result in using a driver PM to operate an actual load switch peripheral
(i.e., an electrical relay).
1 #include <sancus/reactive.h>
2
3 #include "commands.h"
4
5 SM_OUTPUT(HASM_LS , cs_out);
6 SM_OUTPUT(HASM_LS , esme_out);
7
8 static uint8_t SM_DATA(HASM_LS)
9 sply_state;
10
11 SM_INPUT(HASM_LS , cs_in , data ,
12 len)
13 {
14 if (data [2] & ENABLE_SPLY) {
15 sply_state = SPLY_ENABLED;
16 cs_out(ENABLE_SPLY , 1);
17 }
18 if (data [2] & DISABLE_SPLY) {
19 sply_state = SPLY_DISABLED;
20 cs_out(DISABLE_SPLY , 1);
21 }
22 if (data [2] & GET_SPLY_STAT) {
23 cs_out(sply_state , 1);
24 }
25 }
26
27 SM_INPUT(HASM_LS , esme_in , data ,
28 len)
29 {
30 if (data [2] & GET_SPLY_STAT) {
31 esme_out(sply_state , 1);
32 }
33 }
34
Listing 2: Simplified C source code of the Load Switch PM: hasm ls.c
Use of Separate CPUs. Another important aspect of using a PMA is that
strong isolation and integrity protection of PMs guarantee that a PM’s code
and data can only be accessed through well-defined entry point functions. This
effectively rules out attacks from the OS or any other software on a computing
node. As a result, two PMs can securely co-exist on the same computing node
without risking interactions that lead to manipulation of a PM’s state in a way
that is not defined by the source code of the PM, which is why we decided to
deploy the Load Switch on the same node as the ESME. However, as we discuss
in Section 5 guaranteeing availability and system progress may require further
changes to the configuration. That is, availability and real-time requirements
must be reflected by the hardware configuration. As evident from our deployment
mechanism, module configurations and deployment details are easily adapted to
different hardware configurations.
Persistent Storage. Strong component isolation further weakens the require-
ment for implementing a dedicated data storage component. Instead individual
PMs can securely store operational data in the modules’ secret data section
and manage access to this data directly. This is particularly true in the case
of size-bounded circular log buffers as specified in [6]. Methods to persist this
operational data can be implemented with hardware support by the PMA [24].
Alternatively, secure resource sharing for persistent storage can be implemented
as described in [26], via an intermediate PM that implements an access control
policy for the module that “owns” the data.
5 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the TCB and security properties of our HASM
implementation. Our prototypic implementation is based on a developmental
version of Contiki 3.x running on a Sancus-enabled openMSP430 [10,19] that
is programmed on a Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA. We do not provide a detailed
performance evaluation as this does not yield interesting results beyond what is
published in related work [19,18,26]: module loading, enabling protection, initial
attestation and key deployment is relatively slow and may prolong startup of
a HASM by a few milliseconds. The performance of cryptographic operations
at run-time does not incur prohibitive overheads and the relatively relaxed real-
time constraints specified in [6] (in the order of tens of seconds or minutes) can
easily be met by our implementation. These results are in-line with a previous
implementation of a smart meter for the MSP430 [17], where cryptography is
implemented in software. A discussion of availability and real-time guarantees of
our approach in the presence of adversaries concludes this section.
Table 1. Size of the software for running the evaluation scenario. The shaded compo-
nents are part of the TCB.
Source Binary
Component LOC Size (B) Deployed
Contiki 38386 16316 per node
Event manager 598 1730 per node
Module loader 906 1959 per node
ESME/HASM Core 119 2573 once
Load Switch 79 2377 once
HAN Gateway 30 1599 once
Central System 63 2069 once
Deployment Descriptor 90 n/a n/a
TCB Size and Implications. Table 1 shows the sizes of the different software
components deployed on nodes. As can be seen, the majority of the code running
on a node – about 40 kLOC – is untrusted in our model. A total of only 291 LOC
comprising of the actual application code is compiled to PMs and needs to be
trusted, together with 90 LOC of the deployment descriptor. That is, only 1% of
the deployed code base is part of the software TCB. When looking at the binary
sizes of the these software components, the difference between infrastructure
components (19.5 KiB) versus TCB (8.4 KiB, 43.1%) appears less prominent,
which is due to a large number of conditionally compiled statements in Contiki
as well as compiler generated entry points and stub code in the PMs.
For a full implementation of a HASM that provides trusted paths from
sensors to the Central System, one also has to consider driver code. Without
having the actual physical components for building a smart meter available,
we conjecture that the sizes of such driver PMs are probably on par with our
HASM implementation. Nevertheless, the reduction of the TCB when using our
approach is substantial in comparison with other implementations that focus
on security and attestation [14], which leads to a reduced attack surface on
each node. The application owner, i.e., the grid operator, does not have to trust
any infrastructure software but the driver modules that his application uses. As
shown in related work, embedded programs of the size of our HASM PMs can
be formally verified at acceptable efforts [22] and are more manageable in safety
and security certification than the entire deployed code base. Of course, the TCB
of our scenario also includes compilers and hardware. We aim to address the
security of these parts of the TCB by means of secure compilation [20].
Security Evaluation. As explained in Section 3, the security property offered
by our approach is that any physical output event can be explained by means
of the untampered code of the application, and the actual physical input events
that have happened. For the operator of a smart grid, this is a valuable property:
it means that the response to a request to disable supply at a client’s premises
implies that the request was received and processed, down to the level of the
Load Switch driver. To give another example, the guarantee also means that
received consumption data is indeed based on the measurement of a specific
metering element and the chain of untampered PMs that process the measurement.
Together with the use of timestamps and nonces (at application level) and the
built-in cryptographic communication primitives, our approach provides further
confidentiality and freshness guarantees for the system’s outputs.
From our discussion of design choices it can be seen that the use of PMAs must
be considered early in the software development cycle since component isolation
will affect the way in which components interact with one another. In particular,
different protection domains cannot easily communicate through shared memory
but must rely on cryptography and authenticated method invocation. Software
developers will require tool support to isolate security critical code in protected
modules, to design communication mechanisms and to to assess the reliability,
performance and security characteristics of the resulting software system.
Software that is executing in a PM can still be subject to low-level attacks that
exploit implementation details. Such attacks can cause memory corruption within
the module and may even allow the attacker to control the internal execution of
the module. This is because a software component encapsulated in a PM may
offer a richer API than just input and output of primitive values. Methods or
functions callable from the malicious context might also accept references to
mutable objects or function pointers as parameters, or produce those as return
values. Ongoing research addresses this by means of secure compilation, formal
verification and the use of safe programming languages.
Furthermore, while our approach and the use of PMAs in general offer strong
confidentiality and integrity guarantees for software modules, they offer no
availability, let alone real-time guarantees, which we discuss below.
Availability and Real-Time Guarantees. The HASM/ESME reference im-
plementation presented and evaluated above shows the feasibility of encapsulating
high assurance smart metering functionality in isolated PM software components.
Such an approach provides a grid operator with strong guarantees regarding the
internal state of the smart meter and the authenticity of its measurements, while
the underlying infrastructure software remains explicitly untrusted. However,
as the timely execution of the smart metering PMs cannot be ensured, these
guarantees do not extend to availability. Consider for example the scenario where
an adversary exploits a remote vulnerability in the network stack or dynamic
software loader. Our approach prevents such an attacker from operating the Load
Switch peripheral or altering the security logs, but currently does not protect
against various denial-of-service attacks where a malicious or buggy application
for example overwrites crucial OS data structures or monopolises CPU time.
In the context of high assurance smart metering architectures availability
properties cannot be considered out of scope. From the SMIP requirements
document [6], we identified at least the following three real-time properties:
1. The HAN gateway shall receive information updates from the ESME at least
every 10 seconds, and send them out to the IHD for visualisation purposes.
2. When operating in prepaid mode, the ESME shall be capable of monitoring
the leftover credit balance, and disabling the power supply when a certain
“disablement threshold” has been exceeded.
3. The ESME shall include measures to prevent physical tampering with the
device. Upon detection of an unauthorised physical break-in event, the ESME
shall establish a “locked state” whereby the power supply is disabled.
A challenging aspect of our proposed architecture is how to incorporate
such hard real-time constraints. While non-trivial, we believe our reference
implementation can serve as a base for an enhanced architecture that preserves
the timely execution of security- and safety-critical functionality, even on a
partially compromised smart meter. In the following, we outline several required
extensions that allow the above real-time criteria to be met, without enlarging
the TCB for the grid operator’s security guarantees.
Secure Interrupt Handling. In a real-time computing system interrupts are
commonly used to notify the processor of some asynchronous outside world event
that requires immediate action. As an example, to meet requirement 3 above,
a push button connected to the smart meter’s case could raise an Interrupt
Request (IRQ) when detecting physical tampering with the device. In response
to such an IRQ, the PM operating the Load Switch should be activated so as to
establish the locked state and disable the power supply.
Importantly, while the SMIP smart meter specifications document [6] does
not provide a specific timing constraint for establishing the locked state, this
real-time deadline can be considered hard. That is, severe system damage (e.g.,
damage to the grid or critical infrastructure, large-scale fraud) may occur when
an adversary succeeds in physically accessing the smart meter’s internals without
the locked state being established.
The idea to enable secure interrupt handling in our ESME reference imple-
mentation is to register the entry point of the Load Switch PM as the interrupt
handler for the intrusion detection IRQ. There are multiple ways in which an
adversary, after having gained code execution on the smart meter, can prevent
the IRQ handler from being (timely) executed. First, an attacker may overwrite
the system-wide Interrupt Vector Table (IVT) that records interrupt handler
addresses. This can be prevented by mapping the IVT memory addresses into
the immutable text section of a dedicated PM. Second, an adversary may hold
on to the CPU by disabling interrupts for arbitrary long times. To prevent such a
scenario, and to establish a deterministic interrupt latency, running applications
should not be allowed to unconditionally disable interrupts. For this, a hard-
ware/software co-design has been proposed [27] to make PMs fully interruptible
and reentrant, without introducing a privileged software layer that enlarges
their software TCB, and while preserving secure compilation guarantees [20] via
limited-length atomic code sections in a preemptive environment.
Preemptive Multitasking. Requirements 1 and 2 above necessitate the periodic
execution of the ESME PM to monitor the client’s power consumption and
outstanding prepaid credit. In our current event-driven prototype, the Event
Manager might schedule a periodic event that updates power consumption
measurements in the ESME PM. However, when all input and output events
have run-to-completion semantics, the Event Manager cannot be guaranteed to
be timely executed, if at all. We will therefore explore preemptive scheduling of
event handlers where a lightweight protected scheduler PM configures a timer
interrupt before passing control to the untrusted event handler thread. Such an
approach enables the protected scheduler (or Event Manager for that matter) to
multiplex CPU time between multiple mutually distrusting application threads,
while remaining responsive to asynchronous external events.
Importantly, in line with the notion of authentic execution introduced in
Section 3, the protected scheduler should solely encapsulate the scheduling policy.
A compromised scheduler PM should affect CPU availability only, and should not
change the property that a grid operator can explain all physical output events
by means of the observed physical input events and the application’s source code.
However, after successful attestation of the scheduler PM, the grid operator will
be provided with additional availability guarantees, as defined by the scheduling
policy. This ensures that, even in the case of a network failure or compromised
infrastructure software, the smart meter’s vital functionality will continue to
execute as expected: power consumption will be monitored, and the supply will
be disabled when the accumulated debt exceeds the pre-set threshold.
6 Conclusions
We have implemented and discussed a proof-of-concept prototype of a security-
focused software stack for a smart metering scenario. Our implementation includes
a High Assurance Smart Meter, a Load Switch, a HAN Gateway with In-Home
Display, and a simplified Central System. Relying on the security guarantees
of an embedded Protected Module Architecture, our approach and prototype
guarantee that all outputs of the software system can be explained by the
system’s source code and the actual physical input events. We further guarantee
integrity and confidentiality of messages while relying on a very small software
Trusted Computing Base. For scenarios that involve critical infrastructure, such
as the smart grid, we believe that our approach has the strategic advantage of
enabling formal verification and security certification of small, isolated software
components while maintaining the strong security guarantees of the distributed
system that is formed by the interaction of these components.
In future work we will extend the prototype to support real electricity metering
hardware and work towards providing strong real-time and availability guarantees
in distributed event-driven smart sensing scenarios. We believe that our approach
for implementing the smart meter can be reused to implement similar applications
in the Internet of Things or in sensor networks.
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